civilization is, in any case, precisely these scattered villages...
Al-e Ahmad, Owrazan i
INTRODUCTION
In the village of Bireka in central Kordofan in western Sudan, as elsewhere, the political actions of persons at the 'capillaries' of power, and their 'ordinary' village-level competitions over resources, are enmeshed in discursive struggles over the meanings of representations of gender, ethnicity, class and community. People understand the power of these notions, and they understand how actions, practices and words constitute and transform representations.
They do not hesitate to use representations to legitimate, justify and naturalize particular interests.
Analyzing political relations, then, involves viewing politics as a process where contestations over representations are central events.
In a prescient discussion, Cohen (1969:224) succinctly summed up this approach: Some action theorists take the rules of the game, i.e. the symbols governing social behavior, as given and as being outside the 'arena' in which the struggle for power takes place, when in fact these symbols are dramatically involved in the whole process at every one of its stages.
Local and national discourses of gender, ethnicity and class are mobilized to reshape the framework and rules that regulate political actions and determine access to resources (Berry 1993; Watts 1988; and Moore 1994) . Gendered roles in public and conjugal spaces are often key battlefields where access is disputed. For example, Carney and Watts (1990) show how the Gambian state gave men control over irrigated rice plots that were formerly controlled by women.
New irrigation technology entailed an intensification of work. The struggles brought about by these changes were played out on one 'terrain' of gender-what it meant to be a husband/wife in a Mandinka household, and what comprised their respective rights and obligations. Men and women use the full range of dominant and subversive gender ideologies in the process of struggles, not just within households, or between men and women, but also in confounding and influencing struggles involving other social identities and relationships (Di Leonardo 1991; Moore 1992 ).
Most analyses of political processes in Sudan, however, tend to ignore the centrality of these gender, ethnic and class representations.
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The problem of maintaining national unity in northern Sudan, for instance, is seen as a problem of political sectarianism, elite action, and foreign intervention. Warburg's (1985:237; see also, Warburg 1993 ) assertion is typical of this approach to Sudanese politics: With Ansari followers concentrated in the western regions of Kordofan and Dar Fur, in close proximity to an unpredictable ruler like Qadhafi, the very precarious unity of this vast Sudanese state could be threatened.
The analysis-basically of passive peasant 'followers' waiting for the call from The paradox is that the regime's attempts to 'create' more Jaabirs may be leading many Sudanese to embrace discourses, symbols and practices that contradict the NIF program, and which undermine their goal of creating legitimacy 'from below'. We illustrate this point with a discussion of a second conflict in Bireka, over the regulation of a roadside market. There, women in Bireka who joined the Shabab al-Watun used their membership as a rhetorical weapon in their fight against policies implemented by local agents of the government. Beating local history to the rhythm of Khartoum, by recruiting and training people like Jaabir, could well exacerbate an already well-established trend towards civil breakdown.
This paper marks a first step toward understanding the micro-politics of this civil breakdown. We focus particular attention on examining two central conflicts in the village of Bireka during the three years between 1989 and 1992.
In one conflict over the administration of a women's grain bank, some wealthy even some wealthy villagers declared that the motive driving the obstructionists was that they hoped to eliminate competitors and muscle their way into the lucrative market activity.
These conflict situations revealed the critical role played by the military regime and the NIF as their policies and rhetoric were applied and manipulated to fit local contexts. The delegation of authority to agents and descendants of the former Native Administration determined the outcome of the second conflict. Women stopped selling tea after the local omda ordered them whipped.
His decisiveness in the action was facilitated in part by the regime's ambiguous message about the role of women in public life. Leaders of the regime encouraged more female participation, but actions were taken-such as enforcing prohibitions against beer-brewing in rural areas-that undermined women's livelihoods. The regime has had a similarly ambivalent attitude towards ethnic issues. 
STATE REPRESENTATIONS AND POLICIES
Nearly all commentators agree that in the ten years since the publication of Ali Abdel Gadir Ali's The Sudanese Economy in Disarray the Sudanese economy has gone from disarray to almost total collapse. Gross National Product per capita stagnated after the mid-1970s oil crisis, and declined steadily through the 1980s. The industrial sector has exhibited almost no new investment. Yields on major agricultural schemes have fallen to extraordinarily low levels. This collapse has been particularly evident in Kordofan province. Riely (1991) has documented the growing poverty (and feminization of poverty) among settled nomads in North Kordofan. traces the increasing marginalization of herders and farmers in dar Hamr in western Kordofan. Manger (1981) and Abdalla (1985) have presented evidence on ecological deterioration. Only the large flow of remittances from workers in the Gulf States, Iraq, and Libya has kept the economy afloat. Even so, the remittances have proved a mixed blessing. Brown (1992) argues that confusion over the management of remittances by both the government and international agencies, and the resulting distortions in prices and policies, contributed heavily to the mismanagement of the macroeconomy.
From a political economy perspective, the collapse of the Sudanese economy may be seen as the inevitable outcome of processes of disarticulation and dependency, of peripheral incorporation into the global market economy (Sultan 1993; Suliman 1992; Mohamed 1989; El Mekki 1986; Tully 1988; and Prendergast 1991) . Privileged classes, including the military, have transformed the colonial legacy of a relatively strong state into an instrument for 'accumulation from above'. The organization African Rights (1994) goes so far as to argue that the civil war is perpetuated by the rent-seekers who benefit from the distortions justified in the name or wartime exigencies. The use of the state to transform property relations, especially in the mechanized farming areas, manipulate markets for agricultural goods, and regulate labor relations on the large-scale irrigated schemes, usually to the detriment of migrants from the west, have precipitated a process of differentiation and deterioration in the more peripheral rural areas.
In this context of increasing vulnerability and marginalization, the Revolutionary Command Council of the military regime that assumed power in the June 1989 coup, and its ally the National Islamic Front, have vigorously pursued a program of transforming both rural and national politics.
iii Because of the lack of any significant power base in the country, the process has been topdown, rather than grass-roots. We focus here on three of the more salient transformations emanating from Khartoum and affecting rural areas: the return to Native Administration; changes in the rhetoric about the proper behavior of women; and a subtle transformation in representations of being 'Sudanese'.
i. The Return to Native Administration
One of the most significant changes made by the Khartoum government has been to return authority to adjudicate local disputes and collect taxes to 'traditional' leaders. These leaders, the sheikh at the village level, omda at the district level, and nazir or makk at the 'tribal' level, were given a great deal of power during the Condominium period of 'joint' British-Egyptian rule.
The British moved towards Native Administration or Indirect Rule in order to save money on administration and minimize the influence of a nascent effendi class of bureaucrats (Voll 1971) . The first serious challenge to the sheikhs came in the late 1960's (Howell 1973; Nyquist 1966 (and urban) women to work and interact in public spheres (El Bakri and Kameir 1990) . Riely (1991) illustrates how permanent drought and migration of men has resulted in a feminization of poverty in the northern part of Kordofan province.
Most women have income-generating enterprises; they either work on their own agricultural plots, market foodstuffs, or brew beer.
An analogous economic process-the migration of men to the Gulf Stares and Saudi Arabia-has led to a reconceptualizing of the role of women in many parts of Sudan. Boddy (1989) , for example, concludes her discussion of the full and changing complexity of local representations and practices of womanhood in the context of a riverain village in Northern Sudan (1989:344) , by observing that: It is undeniable that women's behavior is more rigorously controlled than men's. Moreover, women are under considerable pressure to conform to the rather specific ideals of their sex... they are jural minors all their lives and subject to notable constraints throughout their reproductive years. And this situation, if the fundamentalist repercussions of men's Arabian labor experience and the recent (1983) declaration of shari'a law are any indication, is currently intensifying.
These evolving and sometimes unacknowledged changes in norms and practices set the context for regime policy.
The NIF has rejected the 'traditional' attitudes towards women. According to El-Affendi (1991:174) : ... the stance which is more in line with Islamic principles would be to accept full participation of women in public life, subject to reasonable safeguards and provisions allowed for in Shariah.
Whatever the potential damage that may arise from free mixing of the sexes, this should not be used as an argument to deprive women of the actual and undisputable benefits of participation in public life...
In terms of specific policies, the NIF claims to have encouraged the participation of women in political and public life. Hassan al-Turabi, in Lowrie (1993:46-7) , argued that the appointment of around thirty women to the national parliament, and equal (though segregated at some levels) access to education, was evidence that "the issue of women in the Sudan is no longer a topical issue." The rhetoric could be used to practical effect; Bechtold (1976:158, 195) observes that the revised 1957 Sudanese Nationality Ordinance allowed the Umma party to grant citizenship to and register loyal Hausa and other West Africans.
The NIF has been explicit about equating 'being Sudanese' with a particular Islamic orthodoxy. Hale (1992) quotes Wisal al-Mahdi, the wife of Hassan alTurabi and an NIF activist:
We want Islam to judge our cases; we want Islam to judge our economical activities... We want Islam to be practiced in everyday life, not just inside the house...we don't want it to be only in a corner of the life of the family. We want it to be the core of life...
[for] the whole society and the whole Sudan and the whole Muslim world. That is the only difference between the NIF and the [rest of] Sudanese society as it has existed since independence.
Hassan al-Turabi has voiced similar sentiments about the Sudanese nation:
So there is an attempt, now, to contain the whole Sudan, the Salafis, the Sufis, the Ansar, the Khatmiya, even the smaller sects, religious sects, and the small groups in society, and the professions, and the artisans; everybody is there. (Lowrie, 1993:45) The nobility of the sentiment expressed is betrayed by the glaring omission This rhetoric also influences local representations of ethnicity. It is ironic that much of the original work on the fluidity and mutability of ethnic identity was once carried out in western Sudan (Barth 1969 
POLITICAL POWER AND REPRESENTATIONS IN BIREKA VILLAGE
The new national-level representations described above were inserted into the evolution of intra-village social relations in Bireka, a small village of approximately sixty households in Kordofan province. The following section then concentrates on showing how changes were manifested and manipulated in two village conflicts.
For Bireka devolution of official authority to the omda had been the object of considerable discussion. Formal political authority in the village had until then been invested in the village sheikh and the village representatives to the district People's Committee. The sheikh was nominally responsible for maintaining village order, resolving disputes and collecting the animal tax.
The district omda, the traditional leader of about fifty village sheikhs in the Sheikan area of dar Bederiya (the home area of the Bederiya tribe under the British system of Native Administration) also lived in Bireka. He and his two brothers were very active in village politics and the resolution of disputes, as the sheikh was rather ineffectual.
Both the sheikh and omda were nominally hereditary positions, though in practice over the past century genealogical links were rather tenuous.
The village members of the People's Committee represented the village to the regional government in El Obeid, and were responsible for the collection and distribution of rationed commodities like sugar, tea, soap and grain. Committee members were supposed to be elected, but in Bireka as elsewhere were more often selected through consensus, with holders of political power agreeing amongst themselves who the representatives should be.
These holders of formal political power were members of ethnic groups that shared a loose identity as Arabs, in contra-distinction with groups whose origins lay further west-primarily Hausa and Burgo. group, there were sharp internal divisions within the group based on wealth.
They were divided into two quarters, one consisting predominantly of poorer households, the other of the wealthier families. The wealthier families represented the Hausa community in village meetings, and acted as leaders in internal disputes and debates. They had followed patterns of accumulation similar to the wealthy Arab families: sons had migrated to Libya, one family had purchased a lorry, another had established a store on the roadside (described in more detail below), and two had established small irrigated gardens.
The first large community to settle in Bireka were Burgo from the Chad Islamic rain prayers (salat al istisqa').
While serving an exemplary and absolutely necessary purpose, given the widespread drought and crop failure, the prayers also conveniently served to generate implicit public displays of the legitimacy of the regime. Some neighboring villages had already initiated rain prayers and fasting and karama, communal meals with prayer, on their own.
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In Bireka all the villagers-Hausa, Burgo and Arab-were to pray together (normally in the village they each prayed in their own mosques, only praying together on
Fridays at the large mosque in the market village). In a highly political act, one Burgo man, a respected/feared faqih, refused to participate in the prayers.
His argument at the time was that the government could not determine the method and rituals of prayer-doing so violated the whole spirit of prayer.
The changing role of Islam in public life especially affected the Hausa, who were, as we will see more clearly below, caught in a dialectic of incorporation and separateness. As many of them were not officially recognized citizens, the benefits from incorporation were great. At the same time, maintenance of Hausa identity was important in the struggles over control of village politics. New conflations of Islam and 'being Sudanese' were a significant source of anxiety in casual conversation, and several Hausa men had taken the initiative of regularly attending evening 'classes' given by the imam in the neighboring market village.
A visiting religious guide (a murshid) visited the village, and the Hausa enthusiastically agreed to participate in the setting up of a program for religious education of boys. A Hausa man was appointed to be faqih and lead the boys in reciting the Koran every evening.
Arab boys participated in the first week, but then their parents decided they should no longer attend.
Finally, lest the reader think that life in Bireka was nothing more than stratagems and spoils xxi , we should note that everyday politics was constrained by a shared awareness of the crucial nature of language about community.
Throughout most of our stay in Bireka, the standard answer to questions about village politics was: 'There are no problems here, we live together peacefully.'
But this solidarity was tempered by the sharp gradations of wealth within the village, and quite articulate notions of class consciousness within the village. As noted above, there were several Arab and Hausa families who were significantly wealthier than others, with large livestock holdings, irrigated gardens, lorries or trading capital, and relatives who had migrated to Iraq, Libya and the Gulf States. They contrasted with the one-third of households which had male or female members who worked as daily laborers, and whose household assets typically consisted of their hut, a few goats, and simple household furnishings. These differences did not result in any overt class conflict, at least not in 1989 or early 1990. Labor relations were cordial, with an active, competitive, and decentralized market for hiring spot labor. Laborers were not enmeshed in debt relations with their employers. Indeed, there was almost no intra-village debt at all. Nevertheless, poor villagers would often note the structural differences in the village, and how those differences translated into different interpretations of community interests. Wealthy villagers were selected as members of the People's Committee, in charge of securing and distributing rationed commodities, and the weekly distributions were the sites of numerous arguments. There were frequent muttered complaints of corruption and favoritism, both in Bireka and in the larger market villages.
Village unity was also undermined by the ethnic differences described above. Hausa, Burgo and Arab all prayed in their own small village mosques. 
THE DYNAMICS OF VILLAGE POLITICAL STRUGGLES
In Bireka, class, gender, ethnicity and community were interrelated social constructs that, together with the political institutions such as the village sheikh and omda and the People's Committee, constituted the structures within which individual political action was embedded. Gender politics and ethnic loyalties in particular confounded simple class and corporate community approaches to politics. Hausa, Arab, and Burgo identities shaped political interaction, and these ethnic identities were also significant components of the intra-household politics that reproduced divisions of gender. Shared notions of gender roles in turn also shaped village politics, which was after all not solely determined by men.
We shall see this quite clearly in this section, where we describe and analyze the micro-dynamics of local politics in two situations of conflict where the role of women in public and economic life figured prominently. The first conflict was over control of a woman's grain cooperative, the second over the permissibility of women working along the roadside.
'Cooperative Conflict'? Drought and Community Struggles over Access to Resources
We will tear down the grain store with our bear hands, and leave the rubble in the street for lorries to run over it, so that everyone can see how the rich tried to destroy the cooperative. Bireka villager, 1990 In 1989 The triple idioms of ethnicity, class and gender were invoked in a struggle over access to resources; resources that were fundamental in alleviating the crisis faced by poorer villagers. The Burgo president did not allow powerful men in the village to undermine her control. She actively sought the backing of other Burgo women and the administration of the 'women's' project. In development discourse, she was an independent, self-starting women, and therefore a perfect project leader. The powerful Arab men wanted to control the project, pitched at empowering village women, once it became apparent that proceeds were more substantial than the usual weaved baskets and embroidery of most womenbased development efforts. They used the discourse of proper public behavior of women to justify their interest. When Hassan, the wealthy Arab, put forth his wife as a potential president, he contrasted her, a quiet, modest, pleasant young mother, with Khadija. Khadija was a divorced, independent, brash woman, potentially corrupt. Her brother was frequently called upon to 'control' her.
She was, in dominant male village discourse, disrespectable and an inappropriate project leader.
A conflict that was initially phrased in terms of the role of men and women in public life was basically about competing claims to power in the village, and was ultimately resolved when the idiom of ethnicity was invoked. It was perhaps ironic that Hausa men were confronted with a similar rhetoric of exclusion that they used on women. In assessing the relative merits of the claims, they decided that Hausa identity depended less on the seclusion of women and more on an assertion of rights to participate in village institutions.
During this period, the military regime in Khartoum was transmitting and implementing its own representations and principles of conflict. As they filtered down to the village level, they shaped new relations of power and new discourses.
With the next case study, we illustrate how these changes transformed village relations and, in part, engendered a new crisis over the role of women's work.
'Petty Crimes'? Conflict Over Women's Work at the Roadside
To whip someone for a crime? Yes. This is not new. It has existed since colonial times. For petty things, instead of sending someone to prison, they are whipped.
Ahmed Abdallah Idriss Sudan Minister of Justice, 1993 ...the police came and wanted to beat us, but we said we were the government and we would be beating them before too long. Bireka villager, 1992 Changes Conflict was present. The income earned by the young Burgo girls was extraordinarily high. This sometimes led to conflicts within Burgo households.
For example, in one family, the daughter had hired agricultural laborers with her earnings from her tea-shop. She expected to control the crop income even though her parents considered the fields to be family agriculture. These intrahousehold conflicts over shares and control of income were managed and kept under control because the size of the pie was large and expanding; perceptions were that participation in the roadside economy was a positive sum game.
These perceptions were shattered in the spring of 1991, when the sheikh received a letter from the governor's office in El Obeid ordering the gahawi closed. The official explanation was that the site would be surveyed and permits issued for 'proper' buildings. Operators would have to pay a much larger fee for operating licenses.
Few believed that this was simply a case of 'public improvement'. There were numerous stories about why the governor's office had closed the site. One was that during a celebration of the opening of a regional grain storehouse the driver of the bus transporting a party of government officials had gotten drunk at Um Belda. Another was that jealous merchants who did not have gahawi wanted the government to raze the existing ones so they could take over the area and build larger structures. Some of the local National Islamic Front supporters alleged that the girls working at the gahawi were prostitutes. Most people were convinced that Hausa-Burgo-Arab ethnic rivalries played a decisive role in the closing; people were sure that numerous letters had been sent to the governor's office alleging misbehavior by one group or another. Larger political structures of regional administration were also supposedly involved; the next village down the road saw almost none of the trucks stopping, and the regional rural council president was from that village.
The stands remained closed for almost a year. During that time a new organization started recruiting young people in the area.
Called Shabab alwatan, 'The Nation's Youth', the organization was supposed to agitate on behalf of the Sudanese nation by mobilizing rural populations and by providing community services. Members received identification cards, worked occasionally building schools, cleaning villages and towns, and held meetings. In the El Obeid area, the leaders of the organization were sympathetic to the NIF. They organized military training for chapters and fought alongside militias in southern Kordofan.
For many young people in Bireka, the organization provided a sanctioned forum for social activities. One of the first acts of the local chapter was to build a small 'meeting house' on the outskirts of the village. Many Burgo girls who worked at the gahawi were eager participants.
It was through their involvement with the Shabab al-watan that they decided that the government's closure of the tea stands was no longer valid. They had I.D. cards. They were 'members' of the Sudanese state. How could working be a crime?
After the rainy season many of the young women began to work again at the truck stop. After a few months the police came. According to one young women: About ten girls were taken away, and spent the whole day in the 'prison' yard next to the police station. They were taken to El Obeid, and held outside the court. The police did not take them in, because they knew that they had no reason to close the gahawi in the first place. They brought the girls back.
The women were emboldened by their victory, for they promptly reopened the gahawi.
A few months later, the omda finally received his formal authority from the government. One of his first actions was to order the stands closed. They were causing too much disruption, he argued, and the government had ordered that they be closed until proper procedures were established. The benefits to his intervention were high and the costs relatively low. Many Arab women resented the profits of Hausa and Burgo women and girls. By using his authority to keep the tea stands closed, he acquired prestige and support from NIF supporters, merchants from neighboring villages, and his governmental superiors.
For several months the stands remained closed. Then some of the girls decided that strictly speaking the government and the omda had closed the stands, but had not prohibited working, and so they started making tea under the trees near the road. The police came again. As one young woman put it: They took the girls to court and said they would fine them LS 300 or one month in prison.
How could people pay that much? A delegation of women went to protest at the district offices and made a lot of noise. The girls said they would not pay, they would go to prison. But the police brought them out. They were afraid to take them to the court in El Obeid. They gave twenty-five lashes to five girls. The omda, though, was clearly less concerned about the issue of the morality of young women (the primary concern of the national government) than he was about preventing dissension and disrespect. He and his wealthy supporters may have seen a threat to the economic power that underwrote, in part, their political power. Moreover, national policy had forced him to act, by conflating his legitimacy with enforcement of a particular idea about how 'Sudanese' women should act.
While this conflict was nominally about a principle of conduct issue, power and control over access to resources were at the root. The disruption of the closing of the tea stands caused many villagers to experience large drops in income, but some wealthy villagers were unapologetic. As one villager noted, "If I'm sick and go to the doctor, I have to pay; now the poor complain about their problems, but they should have known better than to get sick." In other words, the poor should know better than to challenge the rich. It was not an accident that the divisions between the whippers and the whipped were the same gender, ethnic and class lines that had previously demarcated and crosscut village battlefields. The appointment represents an interesting inversion of Kapteijns (1985) argument about Mahdist revolts in far western Sudan. Footnotes *This paper was inspired by the senior Hausa man in the village of Bireka use of the proverb, 'When with dwarves, it is best to stay on your knees', to describe the village political relations between Hausa and Arabs. The general meaning was clear: when confronted with people who do not see things your way, you should be careful to pretend to see things their way, lest they resent your presumptuousness. The context in which he used the proverb will become apparent in the text. He and many other villagers in Bireka endeavored to teach us the basic principles of local politics, and the many inadequacies of this paper are a reflection of our inabilities to grasp all that was taught. In the United States, Tom Bassett, Misty Bastian, Jeremy King and Shaun Malarney provided extensive comments. We are also grateful to three anonymous referees for critical comments that led to a substantial rewriting of the paper.
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iv.The re-ascendance of traditional leaders was by no means assured; Daly (1986; has carefully documented the internal disputes within the British administration that led to the formal adoption of Native Administration discussing how the Khartoum administration did not really devote many resources to strengthening, formalizing and curbing the excesses of the institution of tradition leadership.
v.Indian Ocean Newsletter (1 August 1993).
vi.National leaders regularly visit Sheikan, the battle-site where the Mahdi defeated Hicks Pasha, in order to renew their nationalist credentials.
vii.Though as Fluehr-Lobban (1990) points out, this nationalism was rarely secular, most political parties in the north were quite explicit in advocating the dominant role of Islamic ideas in the national domain.
viii.Africa Research Bulletin (Vol. 30, No. 6) . For an interesting discussion of the original Mahdi's attempts to curb variegated Islamic practices in Sudan, and impose a single expression of Islam, see Voll (1979) .
ix.The name of the village, and all personal names, are fictitious.
x.We are by no means trying to 'create' oppositional identities in this paperthe central focus is not how the character or nature of these identities motivates actors, but rather how they use these identities as vocabulary in political discourse. See Spaulding and Kapteijns (1991) and A.A. Ibrahim (1988). xi.Interestingly, one of the first things the omda did, after power was officially transferred to him and the local court was abolished, was to hire the former court clerk as his assistant.
xii.According to the 1955 census, Hausa made up almost 18% of the population of dar Bedeiria, the district that then surrounded El Obeid. See Born (1965:115) .
xiii.One exception-an older Hausa man marrying a very young Burgo girl who was pregnant, and their subsequent divorce-proved the rule.
In some larger neighboring villages there were numerous examples of marriages crossing ethnic boundaries.
xiv.The symbolic representations of Hausa women as secluded and submissive were, of course, confronted with harsh economic realities. One poor Hausa woman said that while Hausa women could not work in agricultural production, she cultivated because she was poor. A few other poorer and older women also farmed individuals plots, although they did not work on the family agriculture.
xv.Hausa women also hand-pounded their grain into flour rather than taking it to town to be ground by the mill. This was a point of pride for both the men and women. Many Hausa indicated that their porridge was superior to that of the other ethnic groups because it was 'pounded by the strong arms of Hausa women '. xvi.On the other hand, O'Brien argues that in eastern Kordofan some West Africans have 'assimilated' Joama Arab identity because of specific influences of national and regional labor markets. In these labor markets, the Joama are reputed to be good cotton pickers. West Africans benefit from adopting the Joama identity, and local Joama have accepted migrants into the group because the migrants are an additional source of labor for their own fields.
xvii.In other villages there were 'Fallata Arab'. For a discussion of the meanings of 'Fallata', see Duffield (1988) . The term was used extensively by Arabs and Burgo, often in the presence of Hausa.
xviii.Some reported, in 1990, making profits of from LS 30 on a bad day up to LS 100 on a good day, a time when the average daily wage for agricultural labor was around LS 30. Most participated in a revolving savings fund with the other tea women. One woman with three shares in the fund took home LS 3600 in savings every two months.
xix.The raids were recounted with considerable hilarity, because the only person caught was the brother of one of the policemen. Being a poor man unable or unwilling to pay the fine, his brother had to loan him the money to avoid being whipped.
xx.Abdalla (1985) reports that rain prayers were held in dar Hamar villages in the early 1980's.
xxi. (Bailey 1980) xxii.There was a direct correlation between age and wealth and the extent to which these ethnic differences were maintained. Poor and young men interacted more freely.
xxiii.Using the word 'fundamentalist' would be simpler but the term is now too connotative of disapproval and discourse about an 'Islamic threat' to western 'national security'. During our stay in western Sudan we never heard another word used locally to describe 'fundamentalists'. Many times people would say "so-and-so is Jabha" referring to the National Islamic Front, or they might say "so-and-so is an akh Muslim", a member of the Muslim Brothers, or finally they might not say anything and just stroke their chins, with a knowing look, indicating that so-and-so's political/religious views were like those of prominent Islamic Front members who wore beards.
